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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Benson Barrera appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict 
finding him guilty of aggravated assault. Barrera claims there was insufficient 
evidence to support his conviction, instructional error, evidentiary error, and 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Starting in January 2010, Barrera had an affair with Juan "Carlos" 
Ramirez' wife, Scarlet. (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.4-12.) Shortly after the affair began, 
Scarlet told Carlos about the affair and asked him for a divorce. (Trial Tr., p.216, 
L.20 - p.218, L.1.) During divorce proceedings, Carlos called Barrera and asked 
him to "please back off' until the divorce was final. (Trial Tr., p.373, L.18 -
p.374, L.8.) 
A few months later, Carlos encountered Barrera in a restaurant 
downtown. (Trial Tr., p.375, Ls.9-14.) Barrera initially gave Carlos a phony 
name, but Carlos figured out who Barrera was and asked him to go outside and 
talk. (Trial Tr., p.377, L.18 - p.380, L.2.) Carlos testified that, during that 
conversation, Barrera "was gloating, letting [him] know that he had been with 
better looking women; that [Scarlet] was nothing, just another notch in his belt." 
(Trial Tr., p.380, Ls.3-5.) One of Barrera's friends joined the conversation and 
asked what was going on and Barrera introduced him as his friend, Scott, "a 
captain in the armed forces." (Trial Tr., p.381, Ls.7-16.) One of Carlos' friends 
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then came up, followed by the group he was with, and the conversation ended. 
(Trial Tr., p.381, Ls.19-22.) 
A few weeks later, Carlos ran into Barrera again. (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.5-7.) 
Barrera "bumped into" Carlos and said, "Hey, Buddy." (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.10-
11.) Carlos' friend advised Barrera, "He's not your buddy. Don't talk to him. 
Leave him alone. Back off," and Barrera left. (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.14-21.) 
Several months later, on January 15, 2011, Barrera was at Grainey's bar 
downtown with his brother, Armando, his friend Jeremy McGinnis, Margery 
Jacobsen, a girl he was dating, and Margery's friend, Megan Nelson. (Trial Tr., 
p.663, Ls.9-11, p.666, Ls.8-9, p.305, L.24 - p.307, L.12.) Carlos was also at 
Grainey's at some point that same night but only stayed for approximately 30 
minutes. (Trial Tr., p.364, L.22, p.365, L.18 - p.366, L.11.) Although Carlos 
denied seeing Barrera at Grainey's, Barrera testified that he passed Carlos on 
his way to the bathroom and Carlos said, "Fucking pussy," as Barrera walked by. 
(Trial Tr., p.369, Ls.10-16, p.436, Ls.11-17, p.671, L.4 - p.672, L.7.) Barrera 
claimed the comment "bugged" him, but he did not respond and returned to his 
friends. (Trial Tr., p.672, Ls.8-19.) 
Rather than complain to his friends about the encounter, Barrera sent a 
text message to Scarlet even though their affair ended approximately six months 
prior. (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.13-19, p.672, Ls.22-24.) The text message read, "I 
saw your pussy ass ex. He tried to get brave but i'm here with two big dudes." 
(Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.7-14; Exhibit 6 (capitalization original).) The message was 
dated 1/16/11 and time stamped 12:22 a.m. (Exhibit 6.) Scarlet responded with 
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"something like, stop it. I'm serious." (Trial Tr., p.225, Ls.2-5.) At 12:25 a.m., 
Barrera wrote back: "So am i. He's little. We're huge. Don't get brave little 
guy[.]" (Trial Tr., p.225, Ls.8-14; Exhibit 7 (capitalization original).) Scarlet then 
said something to the sort of, do me a favor and drop this. He 
didn't do anything to you. Why do you have a problem with him? 
We had an affair when we were still married. You know, you 
shouldn't have a problem with him. He should have a problem with 
you. Just leave him alone. 
(Trial Tr., p.225, L.20 - p.226, L.1.) At 12:47 a.m., Barrera responded, "You and 
him are gay and small." (Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.2-8; Exhibit 8.) Scarlet asked 
Barrera if that made him feel "happy" to say that, and Barrera answered, "Bliss." 
(Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.8-12, p.240, Ls.14-21; Exhibit 9.) 
At 1 :22 a.m., 32 minutes after Barrera sent Scarlet the text message that 
said, "Bliss," he sent her another text that said, "You blow[.]" (Trial Tr., p.737, 
Ls.3-16; Exhibit 10.) The "You blow" message was not sent in response to any 
message from Scarlet. (Id.) Fifteen minutes later, at 1 :37 a.m., Barrera sent 
Scarlet another unsolicited message asking, "Want to fuck?" (Trial Tr., p.737, 
L.23-p.16; Exhibit 11.) 
Barrera and his companions left Grainey's shortly before 2:00 a.m. and 
headed to Jimmy John's then Chronic Tacos to get something to eat. (Trial Tr., 
p.673, L.19 - p.674, L.9.) While the group was sitting in Chronic Tacos, Carlos 
came in with his friend, Robert Sanchez, and Robert's cousin's friend, Greg. 
(Trial Tr., p.384, L.17 - p.386, L.11, p.489, Ls.5-20.) Although there are differing 
accounts of what exactly transpired at Chronic Tacos, all the witnesses generally 
agreed that Carlos and Barrera exchanged words about Barrera's involvement in 
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breaking up Carlos' marriage to Scarlet, yelling to the point where one of the 
Chronic Tacos employees threatened to call the police. (See generally Tr., 
pp.297-299, 311-313, 386-388, 488-492, 558-566, 587-591, 637-641.) Shortly 
thereafter, Carlos left as did Barrera. 1 (Trial Tr., p.394, L.23 - p.397, L.4, p.683, 
Ls.15-19.) 
As Carlos and his friends were walking back to Carlos' car, they again 
encountered Barrera and his friends and, again, there are differing accounts of 
what happened next. (Trial Tr., p.397, L.2 - p.400, L.14; see generally pp.400-
404, 496-99, 574-579, 593-597, 692-697.) Carlos testified that Barrera taunted 
him, saying, "She liked it." (Trial Tr., p.400, Ls.18-20.) Carlos said he responded 
by making a comment about Barrera's failed baseball career, and Barrera 
reacted by taking his coat off, grabbing Carlos' shirt, then grabbing him by the 
neck and head-butting him, causing a deep laceration above Carlos' eye. (Trial 
Tr., p.401, Ls.3-15; Exhibits 2-5.) The others separated the two and, after a 
passerby indicated an intent to call the police, everyone "walked away." (Trial 
Tr., p.597, L.2 - p.599, L.10.) 
Carlos did not initially seek medical attention or the assistance of law 
enforcement, but went to the emergency room several hours later after becoming 
concerned about the nature of his head wound. (Trial Tr., p.415, L.12 -
p.416,L.5.) Hospital personnel notified police and Officer Matthew Canfield 
1 Barrera's date and her friend left after Barrera told Carlos, "me and my buddy 
tag-teamed your ex-wife." (Trial Tr., p.297, Ls.20-25, p.300, Ls.1-7.) 
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responded and interviewed Carlos. (Trial Tr., p.195, L.9-p.196, L.7, p.416, 
Ls.13-16.) 
The state originally charged Barrera with aggravated battery but later 
amended the charge to aggravated assault. (R., pp.67-68, 156-161, 211-212.) 
The case proceeded to trial after which a jury found Barrera guilty of the charged 
offense. (R., p.308.) The court granted Barrera's request for a withheld 
judgment and placed him on probation for five years. (R., pp.312-313, 316-317, 
320-321, 336-337.) Barrera filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.322-325.) 
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ISSUES 
Barrera states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was the evidence presented sufficient to establish Mr. 
Barrera's guilt on the charge of aggravated assault? 
2. Did the district court err when it improperly instructed the jury 
as to the requisite mental state for aggravated assault? 
3. Did the district court err when it admitted to irrelevant and 
prejudicial text messages over Mr. Barrera's objection? 
4. Did the district court when it excluded, on relevance 
grounds, a defense expert on head-butting? 
5. Is Mr. Barrera entitled to a new trial under the cumulative 
error doctrine? 
6. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, constituting a 
fundamental error in violation of Mr. Barrera's due process 
right to a fair trial, when she insulted the function of defense 
counsel during closing arguments? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the state present sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Barrera was guilty of aggravated 
assault? 
2. Does Barrera's claim of instructional error fail because it was invited and 
otherwise not preserved? 
3. Has Barrera failed to show reversible error in the admission of the text 
messages he wrote to Scarlett just prior to his assault on Carlos? 
4. Has Barrera failed to show reversible error in the exclusion of his 
proffered expert on head-butting? 
5. Because Barrera has failed to show any error, is the cumulative error 
doctrine inapplicable? 
6. Has Barrera failed to show the prosecutor's comments during rebuttal 
closing were error much less fundamental error entitling him to a new trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Barrera Has Failed To Show The Evidence Was Not Sufficient To Support His 
Conviction For Aggravated Assault 
A. Introduction 
Barrera challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction for aggravated assault. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) Specifically, he 
contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that "the head-butt purportedly executed by 
[him] constituted 'a means likely to produce great bodily harm."' (Appellant's 
Brief, p.10.) Barrera further argues, "At most, the evidence established a simple 
assault and / or battery" and asks this Court to vacate his withheld judgment, 
"order that a judgment of conviction be entered on the charge, and remand this 
matter to the district court for the State to elect whether to pursue the lesser-
included charges of simple assault and/ or battery." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8, 11.) 
Barrera's argument fails. A review of the evidence presented shows the 
state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find Barrera 
committed an aggravated assault on Carlos Ramirez. Barrera has failed to show 
he is entitled to an acquittal on the charged offense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
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Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting 
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 
Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 
P .2d at 1072. 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove The Essential 
Elements Of Aggravated Assault 
In order for the jury to find Barrera guilty of aggravated assault, the state 
was required to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about January 16, 2011, 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant Benson Barrera unlawfully attempted, with 
apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of 
Juan Carlos Ramirez, 
4. by head-butting the victim, and 
5. the defendant committed that assault by a means or force 
likely to produce great bodily harm. 
(R., p.292.) 
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Barrera challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the last element, 
which required the state to prove he committed the assault "by a means or force 
likely to produce great bodily harm." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The record shows 
otherwise. 
Barrera concedes, as he must, that Dr. Randy Barnes, who treated Carlos 
for the wound inflicted by Barrera, testified that "the significance of the [head-
butting] mechanism does potentially lend itself to some significant injury." (Trial 
Tr., p.274, Ls.14-16.) Dr. Barnes elaborated: 
It may seem counterintuitive to a layperson, but often the 
external findings aren't particularly of as much concern to me on 
the initial evaluation due to a fixed skull with a relatively soft brain 
inside, often it's the force that's applied on that that can cause that 
brain to shift, and so sometimes, the more serious injuries may not 
be readily visible from just, you know, an external skin exam, if you 
will, but those types of injuries can lead to hemorrhaging 
contusions, which is essentially bruising on the brain. Depending 
on the force that's involved, arteries can be torn causing, what, we 
call, an epidural hematoma, which is essentially a life-threatening 
illness. Somebody may look quite well for a few minutes, talking, 
and then suddenly drop dead. And then also some subdural 
hemorrhaging, just different parts of the vascular system within the 
brain that can be injured with that kind of sheer mechanism, so the 
force that's applied, causing the brain to shift in some degree, can 
lend itself to deeper injuries that are readily obvious at the surface. 
(Trial Tr., p.274, L.19 - p.275, L.14.) 
Dr. Barnes further testified that, in his practice as an emergency room 
physician, he has seen patients who have suffered epidural hematomas as a 
result of being head-butted, which "required emergent evacuation from [a] 
neurosurgeon in the operating room." (Trial Tr., p.278, Ls.1-8.) When asked 
how dangerous a head-butt can be, Dr. Barnes responded, "With the right force 
applied, it can be life-threatening." (Trial Tr., p.278, Ls.20-22.) And, when asked 
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whether "a head-butt [is] the kind of mechanism that is likely to cause great 
bodily harm, Dr. Barnes testified, "Absolutely." (Trial Tr., p.278, Ls.23-25.) 
In claiming that Dr. Barnes' testimony was insufficient evidence that 
Barrera's act of head-butting Carlos was committed by a means or force likely to 
produce great bodily harm, Barrera relies, in part, on Dr. Barnes' testimony on 
redirect, that '"[w]ithout seeing the mechanism of the injury, it's challenging to 
know' whether [Carlos] experienced a significant, direct blunt force." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.9-10 (quoting Trial Tr., p.293, Ls.11-17).) In context, Dr. Barnes' 
testimony on this point was as follows: 
Q: And, Doctor, [defense counsel] said to you that, he, meaning 
Carlos, had nothing that attended a significant direct blunt force. 
And you said, no. I'm just curious. Can you know then that Carlos 
didn't experience a significant direct blunt force? 
A: Correct. Without seeing the mechanism of injury, it's 
challenging to know. 
Q: Okay. So I guess where I'm going with this is, is it possible that 
you get hit in the head super hard but you're still okay? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Okay. You have the risk of all the things you've described. 
A: Absolutely, as we talked about that. It's the deceleration injury. 
The skull is fixed and the brain soft inside, does shift with that 
impact, depending on where something may or may not give. 
That's the mechanism for the more significant injury. 
Q: If there are such factors, what makes one person okay and 
another person not okay, receiving the same type of blow? Are 
there such factors? Thickness of skull or anything? 
A: Certainly we all have some anatomical differences that may 
make you predisposed to a certain thing. Again, it's the direction 
and the amount of force that's applied on that certainly is important. 
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Q: So you might just get lucky. 
A: That's correct. 
(Trial Tr., p.293, L.11 - p.294, L.13.) 
Thus, Dr. Barnes' confirmed that the absence of any neurologic or other 
serious injury did not mean Carlos did not experience a "significant direct blunt 
force." Regardless, that neither Dr. Barnes nor any other witness could measure 
the amount of force Barrera applied when he head-butted Carlos, does not mean 
the state failed to prove the final element of aggravated assault because that 
element does not require proof of such. The element can be proven by 
demonstrating that Barrera committed the assault by "a means or force likely to 
produce great bodily harm." (R., p.292 (emphasis added).) Dr. Barnes' 
testimony that a head-butt is "absolutely" a mechanism, i.e., a means, likely to 
cause great bodily harm was evidence from which the jury could conclude the 
state met its burden of proof on the final element of aggravated assault. 
The evidence that Barrera "planned to execute any such head-butt 
carefully enough not to cause the type of injury that would constitute a felony"2 
does not, as Barrera claims, change the sufficiency of the evidence on this point. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) Even assuming Barrera intended to avoid 
producing great bodily harm, this does not mean the mechanism he used to 
2 The state presented evidence that Barrera told a prior girlfriend "if some dude 
ever got brave with him that he would just head-butt him, and he said that they 
would never see it coming, and you can't defend against it." (Trial Tr., p.756, 
Ls.16-20.) Barrera also told her, "he would just have to be careful that he didn't 
break the guy's jaw or anything because he didn't want it to be a felony. He was 
fine with a misdemeanor, but he didn't want a felony." (Trial Tr., p.756, L.23 -
p.757, L.1.) 
11 
assault Carlos was not a means of doing so. Barrera's claim otherwise lacks 
merit. 
Barrera has failed to meet his burden of establishing the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of aggravated assault. 
11. 
Barrera Has Failed To Establish The Court Committed Instructional Error When 
It Responded To The Jury's Question Regarding The Requisite Mental State For 
Aggravated Assault 
A. Introduction 
Barrera "asserts the district court erred when it improperly instructed the 
jury as to the requisite mental state for aggravated assault in response to a jury 
question." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) According to Barrera, "the district court's 
answer to the jury's question lessened the State's burden of proof and violated 
[his] Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Any claim of 
error related to the response otherwise fails under the invited error doctrine. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 
414, 430 (2009). 
C. Because Barrera Consented To The Court's Response To The Jury's 
Question, His Claim Of Error In Relation To That Response Is Precluded 
By The Invited Error Doctrine 
During deliberations, the jury asked, "Regarding Instruction No. 11: To 
prove aggravated assault, does the state need to show that the defendant 
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intended to commit an assault likely to produce great bodily harm? In other 
words, does the defendant's intent apply to the phrase, 'likely to produce great 
bodily harm?"' (Juror Question to Judge During Deliberation3; 10/19/2011 Tr., 
p.91, Ls.6-12.) The court noted there was a "lively discussion with counsel" off 
the record "on what the court should instruct." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.91, Ls.16-18.) 
Following that off-the-record discussion, the court, citing State v. Bonaparte, 114 
Idaho 577, 759 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988), concluded it would respond to the jury's 
question as follows: "The criminal intent which is required is the general intent to 
willfully commit an act, the direct, natural and probable consequences of which if 
successfully completed would be the injury to another. The intent to cause any 
particular injury is not necessary." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.93, Ls.1-6; Augmentation.) 
Barrera objected stating his belief that "the words 'violent injury' should be 
in there in this case." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.93, Ls.16-17.) Absent his requested 
modification, Barrera asked the court to "consider just telling [the jury] that we 
have instructed fully on the law and sending them back to a careful and concise 
reading of the instructions previously given." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.97, Ls.4-7.) 
Barrera argued: "To the extent that [the proposed answer] will be found in effect 
another jury instruction, it entirely diminishes the requirements that you've 
already given them about violent injury and a means or force likely to produce 
great bodily harm." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.97, Ls.9-13.) The prosecutor suggested 
3 The Juror Question to Judge During Deliberation was augmented to the record 
pursuant to Barrera's motion and is attached hereto as Appendix A. (Motion to 
Augment the Record and Statement in Support Thereof, filed January 10, 2013; 
Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record, dated January 15, 2013.) 
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that, to alleviate Barrera's concerns, the court could advise the jury to read the 
instructions as a whole, as they are required to do. (10/19/2011 Tr., p.95, Ls.19-
22, p.96, Ls.19-21, p.100, Ls.8-10.) Barrera persisted, claiming the jury would 
not "look at the old instructions" but would just "take this new one and if it doesn't 
refer to an injury that's violent, if it doesn't refer to great bodily harm, if it just has 
the word 'injury' or just has the word 'harm,"' the instruction "in essence" tells 
them "to convict." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.99, Ls.18-23.) The court said it was willing 
to accommodate Barrera and asked, "what did you want?" (10/19/2011 Tr., 
p.100, Ls.11-15.) Defense counsel responded: "The state still must prove and 
make the reference to violent injury or make the reference to great bodily harm." 
(10/19/2011 Tr., p.17-19.) Based on this, the court suggested the following 
addition to its proposed answer, "It is for you to decide if there was an assault 
and if it was done by any means or force likely to produce great bodily harm," 
and asked Barrera if that was "acceptable." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.9-12.) Barrera 
suggested modifying the language to say "a means," rather than "any means," 
which the court did. (Augmentation.) 
Barrera argues that although the district court's instructions were 
otherwise correct,4 the court's "response to the jury question modified the 
4 Barrera devotes a portion of his instructional error argument to highlighting the 
district court's rejection of his request to insert the word "intentionally" before the 
word "unlawfully" in Instruction Nos. 3, 11, and 12, and he suggests that the law 
discussing the intent necessary may be incorrect or require clarification. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12, 14-15 and n.12.) Nevertheless, he appears to 
ultimately concede the court's instructions regarding the elements of aggravated 
assault were correct and only claims the response to the jury question was 
erroneous. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) As such, this is the only instructional error 
claim the state will address. 
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instruction to remove the requisite mental state, thereby lightening the State's 
burden of proof in violation of [his] Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Barrera's instructional error claims fails for one of two 
reasons: it is either not preserved or any error was invited. 
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an 
error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error." State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. 
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). "One may 
not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in." Norton, 151 
Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 
P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 
(Ct. App. 1998)). 
Barrera claims he "objected to answering the jury's question." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.13.) This is only partly true. Barrera only objected to answering the 
jury's question if the court did not intend to include the words "violent injury" in its 
response. The court, however, ultimately modified its response to address 
Barrera's concern that the response would "lose" the requirements of "violent 
injury" and "great bodily harm" expressed in the elements instruction (Instruction 
No. 11 (R., p.292)). (10/19/2011 Tr., p.95, L.23-p.96, L.1; p.98, Ls.4-10, p.100, 
L.11 - p.101, L.18.) Barrera cannot now complain about the very response he 
consented to or acquiesced in. 
Barrera's other argument in relation to the court's response to the jury 
question seems to be premised on a different objection than the one made 
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below. The jury's question related to whether the intent requirement applied to 
the great bodily harm element of aggravated assault. (Appendix A.) The court's 
response correctly answered that question. Barrera's only concern about the 
court's response, as originally proposed, was that it did not include the word 
"violent" before injury, which is the element to which the intent requirement 
applied. Because the jury's question related to the intent, if any, required in 
relation to the "great bodily harm" element, the court properly rejected Barrera's 
request to modify its use of the word "injury" with the word "violent," which would 
have created additional confusion between the third and fifth elements of 
aggravated assault. The court, however, addressed Barrera's concern that the 
jury would ignore the elements instruction, as he was afraid they might, by 
reiterating that it was for the jury to decide whether there was an assault 
committed by a means or force likely to produce great bodily harm. (Appendix 
A.) 
On appeal, Barrera's objection to the response is based on an assertion 
that the response "improperly informed the jury that it could convict [him] in the 
absence of any intent to cause injury." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This claim is 
different than the concern raised by defense counsel. As such, this Court should 
decline to consider it. State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 879, 11 P.3d 494, 498 
(Ct. App. 2000) (noting general rule that claims will not be considered for the first 
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time on appeal\ Even if the claim was preserved, Barrera's argument 
ultimately boils down to an assertion that the response allowed the jury to convict 
without proof of specific intent. However, the state had no such burden. 
Bonaparte, 114 Idaho at 580, 759 P.2d at 86. Barrera's claim to the contrary 
lacks merit. 
A. 
111. 
Barrera Has Failed To Establish Error In The Admission Of Two Of His Text 
Messages 
I ntrod u ctio n 
Barrera asserts "the district court erred when it admitted two text 
messages that he sent to [Scarlet], shortly before the altercation with [Carlos]," 
claiming the messages "were irrelevant" and, even assuming "minimal[ ]" 
relevance, "they were unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 and constituted 
impermissible character evidence in violation of Rule 404." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.15-16.) Barrera is incorrect. The district court correctly concluded Barrera's 
"You blow" and "Want to fuck?" text messages to Scarlet were relevant, 
admissible for purposes other than character, and were not unfairly prejudicial. 
(Trial Tr., p.734, L.6 - p.735, L.25.) Even if the district court erred in its 
evidentiary ruling, any error is harmless. 
5 The exception to this rule is that Idaho appellate courts will review fundamental 
errors that clearly violate a defendant's constitution rights. State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 967, 976 (2010). Barrera has not asserted, much less 
established, the court's response to the jury's question resulted in fundamental 
error that may be considered for the first time on appeal. (See generally 
Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the 
province of the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 
(Ct. App. 2011) ( citation omitted). "[A] trial court's determination as to the 
admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed where there has been an 
abuse of that discretion." & 
When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling for abuse of 
discretion, it conducts "a multi-tiered inquiry, examining 1) whether the lower 
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the court acted 
within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 921, 216 P.3d 
1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2009) ( citation omitted). 
C. Barrera's "You Blow" and "Want to fuck?" Text Messages Were Properly 
Admitted 
"Relevant evidence is generally admissible." State v. Harvey, 142 
Idaho 527, 532, 129 P.3d 1276, 1281 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing I.RE. 402). 
"Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Harvey, 142 Idaho at 
532, 129 P.3d at 1281 (citing I.RE. 401 ). "Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
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prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010) (quoting I.RE. 
403). "To exclude evidence under Rule 403, the trial court must address 
whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by one of the 
considerations listed in the Rule." Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722. This 
balancing test is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. kl 
At trial, the state sought to admit a series of text messages Barrera sent to 
Scarlett within hours of Barrera assaulting Carlos.6 Those text messages, which 
were ultimately admitted as Exhibits 6 through 11, read: 
• Exhibit 6, sent 1/16/11 at 12:22 a.m.: "I saw your pussy ass ex. He 
tried to get brave but I'm here with two big dudes." (Capitalization 
original.) 
• Exhibit 7, sent 1/16/11 at 12:25 a.m.: "So am i. He's little. We're 
huge. Don't get brave little guy[.]" (Capitalization original.) 
6 On appeal, Barrera contends, "The State sought to introduce what it classified 
as 404(b) evidence consisting of text messages sent by Mr. Barrera to [Scarlet] 
Ramirez in the hours preceding the incident in this case." (Appellant's Brief, p.16 
(citing R., pp.105-108).) The state does not agree with Barrera's interpretation of 
the state's 404(b) motion. While the text messages at issue on appeal were 
referenced in the "Background" section of the state's 404(b) motion, the text 
messages the state sought to admit as 404(b) evidence were unidentified 
messages Barrera "previously" sent to Scarlet "on more than one occasion that 
he had seen the victim downtown, and that the victim should be afraid of him." 
(R., pp.105-108.) The state's acknowledgment at the pretrial hearing on the 
motion that it had not identified the texts that were subject to the 404(b) motion 
(6/24/2011 Tr., p.9, Ls.10-20) and its later characterization of the texts depicted 
in Exhibits 6-11 as part of the res gestae (Trial Tr., p.342, Ls.7-13) supports the 
conclusion that the state did not offer the text messages specifically identified in 
the "Background" section of its motion as 404(b) evidence. 
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• Exhibit 8, sent 1/16/11 at 12:47 a.m.: "You and him are gay and 
small." 
• Exhibit 9, sent 1/16/11 at 12:50 a.m.: "Bliss" 
• Exhibit 10, sent 1 /16/11 at 1 :22 a.m.: "You blow" 
• Exhibit 11, sent 1/16/11 at 1 :37 a.m.: "Want to fuck?" 
Exhibits 6, 7, and 8 were admitted without objection and the court 
overruled Barrera's relevance objection to Exhibit 9. (Trial Tr., p.226, L.14 -
p.232, L.9.) With respect to the "You blow" (Exhibit 10) and "Want to fuck?" 
(Exhibit 11) text messages, Barrera argued those messages "are not probative of 
anything in this case." (Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.9-17.) The state explained the 
messages were relevant because they supported the state's theory of the case 
that Barrera is "the alpha male that gets the woman and commits acts of 
violence." (Trial Tr., p.229, Ls.4-5; see also p.230, Ls.2-6.) Defense counsel 
responded: "This alpha male thing is an attempt to characterize my client as a 
violent, nasty, vile, filthy fellow, and it has nothing to do, and has no probative 
value, on what happened in the parking lot." (Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.15-19.) 
Defense counsel also referred to the messages as being in the "character zone" 
and as "attempted character assassination." (Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.15, 21.) 
The court initially sustained Barrera's objections to Exhibits 10 and 11 
concluding, "if it is relevant, I think the prejudicial value outweighs the probative 
value." (Trial Tr., p.233, Ls.6-9.) The state renewed its request to admit the 
Exhibits following Scarlett's testimony. (Trial Tr., p.337, L.8 - p.338, L.7.) 
Barrera again objected, arguing: "a nasty text to the wife has nothing to do with 
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aggression toward Carlos, and those two items [Exhibits 10 and 11] have no 
reference to him, have no context to him." (Trial Tr., p.339, L.23 - p.340, L.1.) 
At that point, the court noted it originally viewed the texts as only showing 
Barrera as a "bad person" and "a womanizer," which weighed in favor of 
exclusion based on unfair prejudice. (Trial Tr., p.340, L.18-p.341, L.25.) The 
court agreed to reconsider its ruling if the state wanted to "bring in some case 
law" to support its argument that the evidence was admissible as part of the res 
gestae. (Trial Tr., p.342, Ls.7-15.) 
The court addressed the issue a final time during Barrera's testimony. 
Defense counsel argued Exhibit 10 was irrelevant because it had "nothing to do 
with Carlos or an attitude about Carlos" and Exhibit 11 was similarly irrelevant 
due to its lack of any "reference to Carlos." (Trial Tr., p.729, L.19 - p.730, L.5.) 
Defense counsel further argued, with respect to Exhibit 11, the text message 
was prejudicial, "not admissible under that rule of evidence which prohibits 
inappropriate character attack," "violative of the character prohibitions," and "not 
indicative of a trait for violence" or "of animosity with Carlos." (Trial Tr., p.729, 
L.25 - p.730, L.21.) 
The court allowed the admission of the evidence, reasoning: 
So we have Mr. Barrera, who has now testified. He testified on 
direct examination that there were text messages to Scarlet 
Ramirez. The state's entitled to cross-examine him on those text 
messages. He has testified that, you know, he's there with 
[Margery] Jacobsen. He's bothered by the fact that something 
happened. He wasn't going to be able to hang out with Margery 
Jacobsen . . . and yet he's texting -- while he is still there with 
Margery Jacobsen, and she's with him, he's texting Carlos 
Ramirez' ex-wife and asking her if she wants to fuck. 
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So it goes to his credibility. I mean, he's telling the jurors, 
you know, I want to hang out with Margery, I want to be with her, 
and at the same time he's texting somebody else. So there's some 
-- there's a credibility issue there as well. And so the text to 
Margery [sic] has a tendency to impeach, you know, his credibility. 
From the state's point of view, the defendant's state of mind, 
they also want to show by this that he -- in the text that he texted to 
[Scarlet] was that he did have Carlos on his mind. I mean the 
state's theory of the case is Mr. Barrera was the instigator, at least I 
think so .... 
So as this case has progressed, you know my initial ruling 
was that I felt overruled any relevancy. But as this case 
progressed, then I find, you know, based on all the testimony I've 
heard up to date, that Exhibits 10 and 11, I believe, become more 
relevant. They're more relevant in terms of also corroboration of 
[Carlos'] testimony about the relationship between the defendant 
and his ex-wife. 
So, now we're on cross-examination [of the defendant], and 
I just think it's appropriate at this time to allow the state to go into it. 
(Trial Tr., p.734, L.13 - p.735, L.25.) 
On appeal, Barrera asserts the district court erred in admitting Exhibits 10 
and 11, contending the exhibits were inadmissible character evidence under 
I.R.E. 404(a)(1 ). Even assuming Barrera's generalized references to the 
"character zone," a "character attack" and "character prohibitions" constitute an 
adequate objection for purposes of preserving his I.R.E. 404(a)(1) argument, he 
has failed to show error in the admission of Exhibits 10 and 11 on this basis 
because the district court did not allow admission of the evidence for purposes of 
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proving character (nor did the state seek to admit the evidence on this basis\ 
Instead, the district court ruled the messages were admissible for purposes of 
impeachment, to show Barrera's state of mind in relation to Carlos, and to 
corroborate Carlos' testimony. Barrera ultimately acknowledges as much and 
argues "assuming it was not character evidence prohibited under 404(a)(1 ), the 
evidence was not relevant for any of the reasons stated by the district court." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Barrera is incorrect. 
With respect to the court's ruling that the evidence was relevant for 
impeachment and to corroborate Carlos' testimony, Barrera complains that 
corroboration was unnecessary because the affair was undisputed and his 
pursuit of "simultaneous sexual relationships with more than one person" was not 
pertinent to his credibility absent any evidence that he "was misleading the 
women about being in a monogamous relationship." (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-
21.) Barrera's arguments in this regard fail because evidence impeaching or 
corroborating a witness's testimony is always relevant. See State v. Thumm, 
153 Idaho 533, _, 285 P.3d 348, 355 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting United States 
v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)) ("Generally, 'Proof of bias is almost always 
relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has 
7 In fact, the prosecutor specifically stated otherwise: "I'm not offering these 
texts to show that he's a womanizer. I don't think he was trying to have sex with 
Scarlet Ramirez that night. I, certainly, wouldn't argue that; that's not the 
purpose. The purpose is to show that he has Carlos on his mind, and he's the 
one that persists. He keeps after it. He blames Carlos for what happened, but 
nobody's texting him." (Trial Tr., p.732, L.24 - p.733, L.6.) 
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historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy 
and truth of a witness' testimony."'). 
Even if this Court disagrees with the district court's determination that 
Exhibits 10 and 11 were relevant for purposes of impeachment and 
corroboration, Barrera has offered no argument to support his claim that the 
district erred in concluding the evidence was relevant to Barrera's state of mind 
toward Carlos. Rather, Barrera argues, in conclusory fashion, that the "evidence 
was not relevant for any of the reasons stated by the district court." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.20.) And, with respect to the specific reasoning related to Barrera's state 
of mind, Barrera only argues, "even assuming that the two messages were 
relevant in that regard, their value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) Because Barrera has failed to 
present any argument to support his claim that the court's state of mind 
relevance ruling was incorrect, the Court should not consider that particular 
claim. 8 State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (holding 
that a party waives an issue on appeal if argument or authority is lacking). 
Barrera's prejudice argument also fails. "A lower court's determination 
under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an 
abuse of discretion." Thumm, 153 Idaho at _, 285 P.3d at 355 (citations 
omitted). The district court properly balanced the relevance of Barrera's text 
8 The state also submits the district court's admission of the text messages to 
show Barrera's state of mind was correct. Even Barrera acknowledged in his 
trial testimony that his text messages to Scarlet were, "[t]o a certain point in 
time," "pertinent to what was going on in [his] brain" (Trial Tr., p.727, Ls.16-19) 
and agreed that he had "Carlos on the brain" (Trial Tr., p.728, Ls.14-16). 
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messages in light of the evidence presented at trial and determined the probative 
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. (Trial Tr., p. 734, L.13 - p. 735, L.25.) That Barrera disagrees with the 
court's assessment does not establish an abuse of discretion. 
Even if the Court finds error in the admission of Exhibits 10 and/or 11, any 
error was harmless. An error "will be deemed harmless if the appellate court is 
able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable 
possibility that the event complained of contributed to the conviction." Thumm, 
153 Idaho at _, 285 P.3d at 352 (citation omitted). This Court can easily 
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Exhibits 10 and 11 did not contribute 
to Barrera's conviction for aggravated assault. 
At the end of the day, the question for the jury was whether Barrera 
intentionally head-butted Carlos and whether Barrera acted in self-defense. 
(See R., pp.13-15 (self-defense instructions).) The most damning evidence 
against Barrera was his own testimony in which he acknowledged (1) striking 
Carlos' head (although he claimed it was because he lost his balance) (Trial Tr., 
p.705, Ls.2-5); (2) he has referred to himself as the "alpha male" (Trial Tr., p.711, 
L.16 - p.712, L.5); (3) that it would be "stupid for Carlos to challenge him to a fist 
fight because, as noted in Exhibit 7, Carlos is "little" and Barrera is "huge," 
measuring 6'3" and weighing 230-240 pounds (Trial Tr., p.722, L.10 - p.723, L.5; 
Exhibit 7). Also damning was the fact that Barrera previously told someone that 
if "some dude ever got brave with him that he would just head-butt him" because 
they would "never see it coming" and could not "defend against it." (Trial Tr., 
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p.756, Ls.16-19.) This is precisely what the evidence showed Barrera did not 
long after he told Scarlet that Carlos "tried to get brave." (Exhibit 6.) This 
evidence, coupled with Carlos' testimony about Barrera's actions, supports a 
conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any error in the admission of 
Exhibits 10 and 11 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IV. 
Barrera Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Excluding His Expert Testimony On Head-Butting 
A. Introduction 
Barrera asserts the district court "erred when it concluded that the 
testimony of a proffered defense expert was not relevant." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.23.) Barrera contends the "proffered testimony was relevant to a fact of 
consequence," namely, "the types of head-butts that are likely to cause great 
bodily harm and the types that are not likely to do so." (Appellant's Brief, pp.23, 
26.) Barrera's claim fails. The district court properly exercised its discretion in 
excluding Barrera's head-butting expert. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the 
province of the trial court." Healy, 151 Idaho at 736, 264 P.3d at 77. "[A] trial 
court's determination as to the admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed 
where there has been an abuse of that discretion." ~ 
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C. Barrera Has Failed To Show Error In The Exclusion Of His Head-Butting 
Expert 
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dan 
Embree. (R., pp.183-185.) The grounds for the state's motion were: (1) Mr. 
Embree "is not qualified to opine as to the mechanics, methods, ability of the 
Defendant to execute and purpose of 'headbutting' as a physical attack or 
defense technique;" (2) even if Mr. Embree qualified as an expert, his testimony 
would not aid the trier of fact; and (3) Mr. Embree's testimony would "confuse the 
issues." (R., p.184.) At the hearing on the state's motion, Barrera argued that 
Embree's testimony was necessary to explain "what head-butting is," and how it 
is "administered." (10/5/2011 Tr., p.38, Ls.4-6, 11-12.) Barrera also proffered 
that Mr. Embree could explain "what striking is, what the target, various targets 
can be, what its purpose is." (10/5/2011 Tr., p.38, Ls.16-19.) More specifically, 
Barrera explained that Mr. Embree would testify that a head-butt "calculated to 
produce great bodily harm" is "done by a four-step method," described as 
"keeping the eyes open, stepping into the direction of the attack, bending at the 
waist and neck and propelling yourself upward to strike with the back of the 
head." (10/5/2011 Tr., p.39, Ls.5-17.) Barrera acknowledged that he would not 
know how to administer a head-butt as described by Mr. Embree until Mr. 
Embree "show[ed] [them] in the courtroom." (Trial Tr., p.44, L.25 - p.45, L.3.) 
The court granted the state's motion to exclude Mr. Embree's testimony, 
concluding Embree would not assist the tier of fact but would only serve to 
"confuse them." (10/5/2011 Tr., p .. 50, Ls.4-8.) The court explained: 
27 
Mr. [Embree's] expertise is in martial arts. This is not what 
we had here. We have basically two lay people having a heated 
argument and one of them gets hurt. The state's alleging that it 
was a head-butt, but it was not. They're not alleging in the sense 
of it was a martial arts type maneuver or what, and that's 
something - and there is no evidence that I have that the 
defendant understood at the time of this incident that - how to 
head-butt in martial arts. 
Like I said, I think that would be relevant if he was a martial 
arts person who had taken training in that, then maybe it becomes 
relevant, Mr. [Embree's], but I do not -- I do think that it would 
simply confuse the jury. 
(10/5/2011 Tr., p.50, Ls.8-22.) 
Barrera asserts the district court erred in excluding Mr. Embree's 
testimony and suggests the court's decision "appears to be based on its 
misunderstanding of the nature of the proffered testimony" because "[n]othing in 
defense counsel's offer of proof indicated that Mr. Embree's testimony would be 
limited to head-butts that were only executed by those trained in martial arts." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.26.) According to Barrera, "Mr. Embree's testimony 
concerning the types of head-butts that are likely to cause great bodily harm and 
the types that are not likely to do so was central to the question of guilt in this 
case." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Barrera is incorrect and it is his argument that 
appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the nature of Mr. Embree's 
testimony. 
Mr. Embree's proffered testimony was not for the purpose of explaining 
the types of head-butts that are or are not likely to cause great bodily harm. 
Indeed, it is unclear what qualifications Mr. Embree has to offer such an opinion. 
Rather, Mr. Embree's testimony was for the purpose of explaining "what a head-
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butt is" and how it is "administered" according to Mr. Embree's self-defense 
training technique. (10/5/2011 Tr., p.38, Ls.4-6, p.39, Ls.5-14; see R., p.189 (Mr. 
Embree's explanation of how to administer a head-butt in self-defense and the 
circumstances under which a head-butt should be delivered).) That Mr. Embree 
teaches people to head-butt others in a manner that, at least according to 
Barrera, is "calculated to produce great bodily injury" (Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.15-17), 
does not mean that all head-butts performed any other way do not or cannot 
produce great bodily injury. Again, there is no indication that Mr. Embree, a 
martial arts expert, would be qualified to render such an opinion regarding the 
potential medical consequences of various kinds of head-butting techniques. 
The question for the jury was not whether the particular head-butting "technique" 
used by Barrera (though he denied head-butting at all) was "calculated to 
produce great bodily injury"; the question was whether Barrera "committed the 
assault by a means or force likely to produce great bodily harm." (R., p.292.) 
Contrary to Barrera's claim, Mr. Embree's testimony did not address this 
question. As such, he has failed to establish the district court abused its 
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discretion in excluding Mr. Embree's testimony. 9 
Even if this Court finds the district court erred in excluding Mr. Embree's 
testimony, the error is harmless. Part of Barrera's argument that the exclusion 
was erroneous is premised on the assertion that Mr. Embree's testimony "was a 
natural counterpoint to Dr. Barnes' testimony on the same issue." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.27.) However, the "counterpoint" to Dr. Barnes' testimony was presented 
through a different defense expert - Dr. Gerald Carlson. Dr. Carlson, who had 
experience as a ringside physician for boxers, testified "if I were standing right in 
front of you and would head-butt you, you might break your nose, you might get 
a laceration, you could get a tooth knocked out, okay, but you would not have a 
serious, serious injury." (Trial Tr., p.633, Ls.8-12.) Dr. Carlson also testified that 
lacerations above the eye are "tearing-type injury" that can be caused by a force 
that is "indirect and sliding." (Trial Tr., p.628, L.21 - p.631, L.8.) In light of Dr. 
9 Barrera also contends his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense was 
violated as a result of the exclusion of Mr. Embree's testimony. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.27.) While a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a 
defense, which "includes the right to offer testimony of witnesses, compel their 
attendance, and to present the defendant's version of the facts to the jury so it 
may decide where the truth lies," this right does not allow the Court to ignore the 
rules of evidence. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 
(2009). To the contrary, "[t]he Rules of Evidence embody the balancing test 
which safeguards a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense along 
with protection of the state's interest in the integrity of the criminal trial process." 
~ at 240, 220 P.3d at 1059. Thus, if evidence is deemed inadmissible under 
the applicable rules, the constitutional right to present a defense does not 
override exclusion of the evidence. ~; see State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 
_, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 
(1986) (noting the defendant's failure to provide "any authority holding that the 
exclusion of irrelevant evidence violates a defendant's right to confront the 
witnesses against him"). 
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Carlson's testimony and the substantial evidence of Barrera's guilt, any error in 
the exclusion of Mr. Embree's testimony was harmless. 
V. 
Cumulative Error 
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when 
there is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be 
harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in 
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, _, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and 
alteration omitted). A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error 
doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 
958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, cumulative error analysis does not 
include errors neither objected to nor found fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 
230, 245 P.3d at 982. 
Because Barrera has failed to show any error, much less two or more 
errors, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. 
VI. 
Barrera Has Failed To Establish The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In 
Closing Argument, Much Less That The Prosecutor's Rebuttal Argument 
Amounted To Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Barrera argues that the prosecutor "committed misconduct, constituting 
fundamental error in violation of his due process right to a fair trial, when she 
insulted the function of defense counsel during closing argument." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.28.) Barrera has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the 
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prosecutor's remarks during closing argument, to which he did not object, 
amount to error, much less fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"When prosecutorial misconduct is not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate 
courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the 
violation in question qualifies as fundamental error." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 
245 P.3d at 979. "Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the 
defendant bears the burden of persua[sion]." I.st The first prong requires the 
defendant show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights." I.st Second, the defendant must show the error 
"plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was 
a tactical decision)." I.st Third, the defendant must show the error was "not 
harmless." Id. 
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct During Closing Argument 
During her opening statement, the prosecutor commented: "As they 
remember leaving Chronic Taco, Carlos was so angry and disoriented that he 
walked in the wrong direction." (Trial Tr., p.193, Ls.8-10.) Defense counsel 
referred back to this comment during his closing argument, stating: 
You heard the prosecutor, in her opening statement, promise you 
disorientation, that [Carlos] Ramirez was disoriented that night. I've 
explained to you my empathy for him. I've explained to you that I 
understand his hurt, but I had no idea exactly what the promise of 
the prosecutor meant when she said he was disoriented. Let's 
summarize. 
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Carlos was disoriented when he claimed he never saw 
Benson in Grainey's. Why not admit it? Why be disoriented about 
that? Does anyone hearing the testimony find reason to believe 
that [Carlos] Ramirez pocket-dialed his telephone to Scarlet's 
number four minutes after [Barrera] called to report, inappropriately 
in text and language, that interaction between the two of them? 
Was Mr. Carlos Ramirez disoriented when he told you that 
he never texted Scarlet at 1 :26, as Exhibit O shows you he did, or 
at 1 :45, which Exhibit O shows you he did .... 
Carlos is disoriented when he tells you, collecting and 
contrasting the evidence, that he did not start the verbal encounter 
in Chronic Taco .... 
. . . [Carlos] Ramirez said that he was ready to fight inside Chronic 
Taco. "I'm right here. I'm right here." If he is such a small fellow 
and such an inoffensive human being who would be victimized by a 
much larger man, was he disoriented at those moments when he 
admits to you that he was ready to fight. Eager to fight. We don't 
have to go outside. We don't have to go around the block. I don't 
have to forget where my car is, let's fight here. Obviously, he was 
disoriented about his size and physical capacity. 
And was he disoriented when he told you that not only did 
my client challenge him to fight, my client got up and headed to the 
door .... 
(Trial Tr., p.810, L.15- p.812, L.18.) 
Defense counsel continued highlighting perceived flaws in or 
disagreements with Carlos' testimony, using some variation of the word 
"disoriented" at least 25 more times. (Trial Tr., pp.813-817.) Defense counsel 
summarized: 
And all of these observations, I would suggest to you, 
confirm that [Carlos] Ramirez was disoriented when he testified 
here - perhaps that night - in ways that I've specified. And that if 
you find from those 16 or 17 points of disorientation that [Carlos] 
Ramirez was, indeed, not his best self, I would suggest to you that 
it also is a disorientation for [Carlos] Ramirez to claim that Benson 
Barrera intentionally head-butted him. 
33 
(Trial Tr., p.817, Ls.14-21.) 
The prosecutor opened her rebuttal argument with the following: "After 
defense counsel's remarks to you, my concern is that you are going to be 
disoriented. That you are going to be confused, because that's part of his job, 
about what you're supposed to do here." (Trial Tr., p.818, Ls.11-15.) The 
prosecutor went on to explain that the jury was not tasked with deciding the 
factual discrepancies such as "who yelled at who in Chronic Taco" or "whether 
Benson Barrera ran into Carlos in Grainey's," which were the focus of defense 
counsel's arguments regarding Carlos' "16 or 17 points of disorientation." (Trial 
Tr., p.818, L.15 - p.819, L.8.) Barrera did not object to any of the prosecutor's 
comments. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.818-825.) 
Instead, for the first time on appeal, Barrera complains that the following 
comment violated his right a fair trial: "After defense counsel's remarks to you, 
my concern is that you are going to be disoriented. That you are going to be 
confused, because that's part of his job, about what you're supposed to do here." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Barrera contends the comment was improper because, 
he claims, it "insulted the function of defense counsel." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) 
Barrera has failed to meet his burden of establishing any part of the three-prong 
test for fundamental error. 
Barrera's claim fails on the first prong because the prosecutor's comment 
was not a personal attack or a disparagement of defense counsel. It is not 
insulting for a prosecutor to redirect a jury's focus back to the elements of the 
offense the state is required to prove. That the prosecutor used the word 
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"disoriented," or even "confused," makes sense in light of defense counsel's 
focus on the "disorientations" of Carlos. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 
179 (1986) ("[t]he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in light of the 
defense argument that preceded it"); Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 
440 (a prosecutor's comments "must be evaluated in light of defense conduct 
and in the context of the entire trial"). Suggesting that confusion was part of 
defense counsel's "job" was also not offensive. Quite the opposite, creating 
"confusion," i.e., reasonable doubt, is good advocacy and there is nothing 
insulting about suggesting as much. 
Barrera's claim also fails on prong two of the fundamental error analysis. 
It is difficult to imagine a more "tactical," personal decision than ascertaining 
whether something opposing counsel said was disparaging or offensive toward 
you. Defense counsel in this case was a former prosecutor and Attorney 
General for this state (10/5/2011 Tr., p.49, Ls.3-5 (counsel highlighting during a 
pretrial hearing his prior service as a prosecutor and the "attorney general 
supervising 44 prosecutors")), who certainly had the knowledge and wherewithal 
to decide for himself whether the prosecutor's statement was disparaging and 
objectionable. Yet, he did not object. The state submits that defense counsel 
failed to do so because, contrary to appellate counsel's assessment, the 
prosecutor's comment was not expressed in such a manner as to disparage 
defense counsel. 
Finally, Barrera's prosecutorial misconduct claim fails on the third 
fundamental error prong "[A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned 
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on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or 
conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined 
whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). As explained by the United States 
Supreme Court: "[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were 
undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant question is whether 
the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 
resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Smith v. 
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in 
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the 
culpability of the prosecutor.") State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,451,816 P.2d 
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991) (the function of appellate review is "not to discipline 
the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not 
interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial"). Even if improper, there is no 
reasonable probability that the prosecutor's comment "affected the outcome of 
the trial proceedings." Perry at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). 
Given the strength of the evidence of Barrera's guilt outlined above, the 
court's instruction that the "arguments and statements of the attorneys are not 
evidence" (R., p.302), and the relevant legal standards, which require Barrera to 
show his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by two sentences in the prosecutor's 
rebuttal argument, Barrera's claim fails under prong three of the fundamental 
error test. The fact that Barrera was also a criminal defense attorney 
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(Appellant's Brief, p.30), a point he highlighted at the outset of his testimony 
(Trial Tr., p.663, Ls.3-8), does not change the weight of the evidence, the court's 
instruction, or the applicable legal standard. 
Barrera failed to establish fundamental error entitling him to appellate 
review of his prosecutorial misconduct claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Barrera guilty of aggravated assault. 
DATED this 10th day of April 2013. 
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